Warda-DNS Warda: from ward — to protect, guardian
v0.9.10

Privacy

This site uses no cookie, no tracker, no audience measurement and no content from third parties.

01What this site keeps

  • Nothing on our server: its access logs are turned off.
  • In your browser only: the theme you chose (light, dark or automatic), kept in its local storage, never sent.
  • The chart of the home page asks this site for the daily figures of Warda's analysis service: your address goes with the request only to limit abuse for one day, then it is forgotten.

02The forms

The forms of the beta, of the bugs and of the suggestions send what you typed by e-mail to the Warda team; nothing is kept on the server of the site. Your address is used to limit abuse for one day at most, then forgotten.

03Cloudflare

The site is delivered through Cloudflare, which processes the technical data of the connection (address, browser) to deliver and protect it, according to its own privacy policy.

04Your e-mails

The messages sent to [email protected] and through the forms are only used to answer you, and deleted on request.

05The Warda software and its online service

The Warda software sends anonymous statistics, counted once a day, and its optional online service (warda-cloud) keeps what it needs to work.

  • The statistics hold a random identifier drawn anew each day, the version, the type of installation, the country you chose, the architecture and the plan of the box (Free, Subscription or Warda Business). They are used only to count installations, versions, countries and plans. They leave a few minutes after each start of Warda, then once in the morning and once in the afternoon (UTC); every send of a day carries the identifier of that day and replaces the previous one, so that a box counts once a day, with its last version.
  • Its legal basis is the legitimate interest of the publisher, with an easy opt-out: you can turn it off at any time on the System page of Warda. The same page shows the last send and the next one planned.
  • warda-cloud keeps only the daily totals of these statistics, for 400 days. Cloudflare delivers the service, as a processor.
  • For each box that uses the online service, warda-cloud keeps the public key of the box, the name you gave, the identifier of the installation and the related dates.
  • Unless the second opinion is turned off (Protection settings), a box sends only a suspicious domain it found (a look-alike name, the server of a beacon), to learn its age: warda-cloud asks the registry of the domain (RDAP), keeps the date a week without linking it to the box, and never writes the names in its logs.
  • Only if an administrator turns on the collective base (Collective base page): the box sends registrable domain names only — the decisions of its administrators on suggestions and the names it doubts — never a device, a person, a time or an address. warda-cloud passes them to Warda's analysis service under a pseudonym that changes every month, never with the identity of the box, and returns the opinion of the analysis service, which keeps the names and its opinions.
  • Only if an administrator turns on the protection outside the home (subscription): the DNS queries of the enrolled devices travel, encrypted, through Cloudflare and warda-cloud to the box, which answers them; Cloudflare, which delivers the service, can see them as they pass. When the box cannot be reached, warda-cloud answers them itself through AdGuard DNS (DNS over TLS), which sees the names but not the address of the device. warda-cloud keeps, by box, the SHA-256 fingerprint of the secret of each enrolled device (never the secret), when the relay was last connected and the number of queries answered without the box; never a query, a name, an answer or an address: the address of a device is compared in memory with that of its box, to tell whether it is at home, and never written.
  • The check of the exposure on the Internet (every week, and on request): the box sends a signed request with the ports its router opened by UPnP; warda-cloud connects to the public address the request comes from, and to it only, on those ports and on a fixed list of risky ports, then gives the result to that box alone. It keeps nothing of it but counts by day.
  • The watch of known breaches (subscription): for each address watched, the box sends only the first 6 characters of its SHA-1 fingerprint; warda-cloud asks Have I Been Pwned for the list that matches this prefix and keeps it 24 hours in memory, by prefix, without who asked; a prefix is never written in its logs. The address itself never leaves the box.
  • The test of a password does not go through warda-cloud: the box itself sends to Pwned Passwords (Have I Been Pwned) the first 5 characters of the SHA-1 fingerprint your browser computed; the password never leaves the browser.
  • Unless the reputation of the domains is turned off (Protection settings): the box sends, in a request it signs, the registrable domain of some names (those the household does not know well, and those that imitate a known name; example.com, never the full name), never the device, a person, a time or an address. warda-cloud passes the domain alone to Warda’s analysis service, which keeps it with its opinion without knowing which box asked, and returns that opinion. warda-cloud keeps the answers in memory a few hours, by domain only, shared by every box, and the counters of the daily limits (the key of the box, the address) until midnight UTC; it never writes a domain in its logs.
  • Unless the second opinion is turned off (Protection settings), even without the collective base: for each look-alike name it finds, the box sends, in a request it signs, the registrable domain (example.com), its kind (other letters, typing mistake…) and the known name it imitates, only when that name is a public site of the list built into Warda — never one of the sites the household visits most — once a week at most per domain; never the device, a person, a time or an address. warda-cloud passes them to Warda’s analysis service under a pseudonym that changes every month, never with the identity of the box; the analysis service keeps the name imitated and the kind 90 days with the domain, to judge it for every home. warda-cloud keeps only the counters of the daily limits until midnight UTC and counts by day; it never writes a domain in its logs.
  • To judge a domain, Warda’s analysis service looks it up — the domain alone, never the box or the household that asked — in the threat lists it downloads, with the registry of the domain (RDAP), in the public log of certificates (crt.sh) and through its DNS queries (AdGuard DNS), then, when the Warda team has set their keys, with Google Safe Browsing, VirusTotal and urlscan.io (a search of its past scans). urlscan.io is asked to open a page (an unlisted scan, kept off its public feed) only for the addresses the Warda team submits itself, never for a name sent by a box.
  • The diagnostics sent by the boxes when their owner asks for help are kept 30 days under a code, then deleted; nothing tells which box or which address sent them.
  • With Warda Business, the activity log, the events of the data loss prevention (DLP, kept 90 days) and the unblock requests (kept one year, with their justification) stay on the box of the company: they apply its policy, and the company must inform its employees.
  • To tell a box the country of its public address, warda-cloud reads it from the connection (Cloudflare gives it) and answers without keeping it; only the daily number of these requests is counted.
  • With Warda Business, for an organisation of sites: warda-cloud keeps the organisation, the name, role and dates of each box, and the last state each box sent (counts only, never a domain name, a device, a person or a query); the join codes are kept only as a fingerprint, and an organisation unseen for 180 days is deleted.

06Your rights

Under the GDPR you can access, correct or delete the data that concern you by writing to [email protected]. You can also lodge a complaint with the CNIL (www.cnil.fr).

Questions: [email protected]